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Numerous experiments have shown that
the frequency of cooperative (C) responses
observed in iterated plays of Prisoner’s Di-
lemma depends on the particular payoff
structure of the game. The generalized pay-
off matrix of Prisoner’s Dilemma is repre-
sented by:
where, in accordance with the definition of
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the following inequality
must be satisfied:
Assuming a simple reinforcement effect
in repeated plays, we would expect that the
frequency of C choices would increase as R
and S increase (since these payoffs are as-
sociated with the C choice), and correspond-
ingly, the frequency of C should decrease
as T and P increase, because these payoffs
are associated with the D choice. On the
whole, experimental evidence tends to con-
firm this expectation. Consequently, if we
imagine the &dquo;index of cooperation&dquo; for Pris-
oner’s Dilemma to be a function of the four
payoffs, namely,
the first requirement we should impose on
such a function is
Clearly, this restriction is still too mild to
allow us to choose among the innumerable
functions which satisfy inequalities (3).
Can we impose any additional restrictions?
From the game theoretical point of view, it
is tempting to demand
in accordance with the assumption usually
made in game theory that the payoffs are
utilities, given only up to a positive linear
transformation.
Evidence for or against (4) is scanty, but
what there is seems to be in favor.
If we impose condition (4), the class of
functions to choose from becomes much
smaller. Of these there is a simplest sub-
class, namely quotients of linear polynomials
in the differences (T - R), (T - P), (R
-P), etc.
It can be easily shown that all such
homogeneous bilinear functions can be rep-
resented as
1 The research work on which this paper is
based was supported by Public Health Service
Grant NIH-MH-4238-06.
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There are, of course, many other possible
mpresmtations « formula (5)~ For example,
we could write (5) as
The differences in (6) are especially sug-
gestive in the context of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Thus, assuming that the other player will
choose C, the (positive) difference (T - R)
is a reasonable measure of the pressure to
play D. Assuming that the other player
will choose D, (P-S) is the corresponding
measure of the pressure to play D. There
is also a counterpressure to play C, namely,
the degree to which R (the reward for dou-
ble C) is larger than P (the punishment for
double D); in other words, the difference
(R - P). Since a linear combination of the
six differences can be expressed as a linear
combination of any three of them, the three
differences in (6) } seem to be the most
appropriate for the reasons stated. More-
over, without loss of generality, we can set
a = 1 by properly choosing the payoff units.
Let us now see whether additional restric-
tions can be imposed, so as to simplify our
index still further. We shall suppose K to
be the actual probability of choosing C, as
manifested by the relative frequency of this
choice.
Consider a &dquo;degenerate&dquo; Prisoner’s Di-
lemma game, in which T = R, P = S. In
this game, there ought to be no pressure to
play D, because no gain accrues to the &dquo;de-
fector,&dquo; whether the other plays C or D. On
the other hand, if R > P, both gain by play-
mg C. Therefore, logically we may expect
Next, consider another degenerate game
where R = P. Here there is nothing to gain
from playing C. Hence, logically, we ought
to have
Combining conditions (7) and (8), we
should have
which is the simplest index of cooperation
compatible with the four postulates:
Ai: The index is invariant with respect
to positive linear transformations of the
payoffs.
A2: There is no defection (D) if the cor-
responding pressure is zero while the pres-
sure for cooperation remains positive.
As : There is no cooperation (C) if the
corresponding pressure is zero while the
pressure for defection remains positive.
A~ : Inequalities (3) hold.
Formula (9) has just two free parameters,
f3 and y. The only restriction on these is
that both be nonnegative, for this is the
necessary and sufficient condition to satisfy
A4. Note that if 8 = y = 1, (9) reduces to
which is one of the two indices suggested
elsewhere (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).
If we take a linear combination of the
two indices suggested in the above men-
tioned monograph, we obtain
which is a special case of (6) with m + n
=a-b, a = c = n, ~ == y = 1.
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There is evidence that even if T = R, P
S, defections occur. These may be due
to the fact that subjects pay attention to
the payoff difference, rather than to their
own payoffs (the so-called &dquo;zero-sum bias&dquo;),
as suggested by various authors (e.g., Scodel
et oL, 1959); or they may be due to bore-
dom (in long sequences of repeated plays),
to error, or to malice.
Similarly, there is evidence that even if
R = P, there will be some C choices. These
may be due to &dquo;pure altruism,&dquo; as well as
to boredom or to error. To account for these
cases, postulates AD and As must be dropped.
We have, then, our original formula (6)
with a = 1, on which, however, the restric-
tions embodied in A4 must be imposed. It
can be easily verified that these restrictions
are as follows:
Inequalities (12) are not inconsistent, as
is shown by the following numerical exam-
ple, which satisfies Az through A4:
Robert Axelrod (in this issue) has pro-
posed an &dquo;index of conflict,&dquo; namely
Being an index of &dquo;conflict&dquo; rather than
cooperation, Axelrod’s index should be re-
lated inversely to our proposed index K.
Indeed, it is seen by inspection that
identically. However, the inequality &eth;K’ /
BT ~ 0 may be violated for values of R
close to P.
Clearly, if we are willing to consider more
complex indices than bilinear functions of
the payoffs, the choice of function increases
enormously.
It is not easy to decide the relative merits
of the various indices proposed. The for-
mula (9) above has the advantage of sim-
plicity and of a straightforward interpretation
of the parameters8 and y (weights as-
signed to the &dquo;greed pressure&dquo; [T - R] and
the &dquo;fear pressure&dquo; [P - S]). - On the other
hand, the evidence obtained from &dquo;degen-
erate&dquo; games suggests that this index is not
adequate.
Formula (6), involving five &dquo;semi-free&dquo;
parameters subject only to inequality restric-
tions, is extremely flexible and so can be
&dquo;fitted&dquo; to the varied sets of data. The
flexibility, however, is obtained at a cost of
losing the straightforward interpretation of
the parameters.
Axelrod’s formula, derived from the theory
of negotiable games, has a suggestive geo-
metric interpretation.
Criteria for choosing among the various
formulae can be established only after very
large masses of data under a variety of con-
ditions have been accumulated.
It is important to keep in mind the ad
hoc character of all such indices. In partic-
ular, if the C frequencies are estimated from
the protocols of a whole population of play-
ers, it is not legitimate to conclude that the
index for the whole population is the same
function of the payoffs as the index for an
individual player.
Suppose, for example, the index for each
individual player is given by (6), and sup-
pose the parameters p and y are distributed
uniformly in the population of players in
the range 0 <,8 < 1; 0 < y < 1. Then the
&dquo;average&dquo; index observed in the population
will be
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We can verify that K satisfies postulates
~~ through A4 and so is a &dquo;legitimate&dquo; in-
dex, derived by postulating (6) for each
individual in the population and uniform
independent distributions of the parameters.
Clearly, different distributions of the param-
eters (e.g., Gaussian) will yield still dif-
ferent forms of K. Since an estimate of the
parameters of individuals, and especially of
their distributions in the population, is usu-
ally extremely difficult, the limitations of
such a &dquo;theoretical&dquo; approach are apparent.
For this reason one is forced for the time
being to choose indices more or less arbi-
trarily and to justify them on &dquo;untheoreti-
cal,&dquo; purely pragmatic grounds.
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